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1 Introduction
A major concern in the traditional literature on the formation of free trade areas
(FTAs) has been whether these areas generate welfare gains for the individual
countries that engage in these processes. Since the 1950s (Viner 1950), many authors
have contributed to this debate, especially in the 1990s when studies based on the
gravity model proliferated (Frankel et al. 1995, 1996, 1998). However, none of this
research has attempted to evaluate the determinants of FTA formation.
Only recently have Baier and Bergstrand (2004) developed the first theoretical
and empirical analysis of the economic determinants of FTA formation. They
provide an economic benchmark for future political economy models to explain the
determinants of FTAs. They find evidence showing that pairs of countries will be
more likely to form FTAs if they share the following characteristics: a) they are
geographically close to each other, b) they are remote from the rest of the world, c)
they are large and of a similar economic size, d) the difference of capital-labour
between them is large and e) the difference of their capital-labour ratios is small
compared to the rest of the world. Baier and Bergstrand (BB) only consider whether
or not each pair of countries is involved in an FTA. Therefore the variable they
attempt to explain is binary and takes the values zero and one. Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) show the importance of treating FTAs as endogenous when the determinants
of trade flows are analysed. They show that when the endogeneity of the FTA
variables is taken into account in gravity models, their effect on trade flows is
quintupled.
In this paper, we extend BB’s work in three ways: firstly, we address the
importance of additional economic, geographical and socio-political variables as
determinants of regional integration agreements (RIAs). Secondly, we investigate the
determinants of five different levels of integration between pairs of countries:
Preferential trade agreement (PTA), free trade agreement (FTA), customs union
(CU), single market (SM) and monetary union (MU). Finally, we analyse the
dynamics of the European Union integration process.
We begin by estimating an ordered logit model (instead of a binary probit) with
the same explanatory variables considered by BB to benchmark our extension to
their original work. Then, the ordered logit is estimated with additional economic,
geographical and socio-political variables. The economic variables we consider are
economic size, income differences and factor endowment differences. Adjacency
and landlocked status are added to BB’s list of geographical variables. The socio-
political variables are a shared language, political regime, level of economic freedom
and tariff barriers.
We find that: (i) BB’s results are fairly robust, although the coefficient signs are
reversed for the K–L difference variable with our database; (ii) the additional
characteristics considered have a significant impact on the probability of an RIA being
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formed; (iii) socio-political factors are less important than economic and geographical
factors, but still significant in explaining RIA formation or enhancement.
To our knowledge, only a few authors have studied the determinants of regional
integration who take into account the degree of integration. Wu (2004) considered
different levels of integration ranked across countries. However, her paper focuses
on the role that political and economic uncertainty plays in explaining RIA
formation and her results are not directly comparable to BB since she includes
different explanatory variables in her model. Wu shows that countries’ per capita
income, democracy and geographical characteristics appear to be the best indicators
of the probability of participation in a certain level of RIA in the period 1987–1998.
Surprisingly, Wu (2004) does not consider the distance variable as a determinant of
RIA formation. This omission may influence the results obtained for other variables
since the model is not well specified. Endoh (2006) derived a theoretical framework
to explain the incentives of countries to conclude an RIA. The author stated that “the
economic and political characteristics of determining the existence or absence of
PTAs are quite different from those of FTAs and CUs”.1 Heterogeneity among RIAs
is taken into account in the empirical analysis, in which two different dependent
variables are considered (FTAs/CUs based on GATT Article XXIV and all the PTAs
including other types of agreement based on the Enabling Clause). The methodology
used to estimate is a binary logit model. Finally, Vicard (2006) relates economic and
political integration, and proves that the determinants of regional integration differ
according to the type of regional integration agreement. The heterogeneity in the
nature of RIAs is introduced by taking into account two integration levels: shallow
RIAs (PTAs and FTAs) and deep RIAs (CUs and CMs). The author runs three
different binary probit models, one for all RIAs, one for shallow RIAs and one for
deep RIAs. Unlike these authors, we take on a more difficult question: Why deeper
integration?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 stylised facts in
relation to the reasons why countries decide to engage in deeper economic
integration are discussed. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and the
econometric model. Section 4 describes the data, the variables and the hypothesis to
be tested. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. In Section 6, the model is
estimated for an additional sample, including data for the EU-27 from 1999 to 2007,
thus enabling dynamic issues to be also analysed. Finally, Section 7 presents the
conclusions.
2 Stylised facts
Decisions concerning economic integration are controversial in most cases; there are
global benefits, but they are unevenly distributed among winners and losers. The
best real example of deep economic integration is the European integration process.
Although the initial goal was to avoid undesirable wars within the continent, a much
more ambitious vision was endorsed over the years, that being one of the main goals:
the completion of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Deep integration of this
1 Endoh 2006, page 769.
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form has generated clear benefits to European citizens in terms of welfare and
growth.
However, since the recent accession of ten new member states in 2004 and two
more in 2007, the European Union (EU) has witnessed an intense discussion
regarding its future. The central question of the debate is featured in the title of the
report launched by the Constructing Europe Network (EU-CONSENT): “Wider
Europe, deeper integration? A common theoretical framework”. The main aim of the
EU-CONSENT is to elaborate the scenarios and strategies for the future of European
integration and to evaluate the costs and benefits of each of them, based on the
triangle of deepening, widening and completing. Over the years, the EU has been
considered a “club” with open membership, but as integration deepens, the entry
conditions become more exhaustive. Although uniformity was a rule until recently,
the monetary union as well as other specific agreements (Schengen agreement on
border controls) were restricted only to some members.
The debate concerning deep integration is also open in North America (Campbell
2005) and Asia (Wyplosz 2006). In both cases the expected benefits of deeper
integration are only seen as uncertain, whereas the political-costs are high.
3 Theoretical framework and econometric model
3.1 The theory
Although deep regional integration can proceed along different lines, according to
McKinnon (1979) it should start with domestic goods market liberalisation, followed
by external trade integration, and should proceed with domestic financial market
liberalisation and international capital integration. We define the concept of “deeper
regional integration” in relation to the level of economic integration stated by Viner
(1950). Therefore, deeper RIAs are those involving a higher level of economic
integration. This paper is related to recent research in regional integration that
investigates why countries enter an RIA, although it also focuses on the question of
why countries engage in deeper integration processes.
What are the reasons why countries engage in deeper integration? Until
recently the research in this field focused on the effects of regionalism and
disregarded the economic and political factors which explain the presence or
absence of free trade agreements between pairs of countries. Baier and
Bergstrand (2004) were the first authors to theoretically explain the likelihood of
PTAs between pairs of countries using only economic and geographical factors.
Mansfield et al. (2002) considered this problem from a political-economy point of
view, and demonstrated that more democratic countries had displayed a greater
likelihood of concluding PTAs than other countries. In addition, Endoh (2006)
derived a theoretical framework to explain the incentives of countries to conclude
an RIA. The author stated that the economic and political characteristics of
determining the existence or absence of PTAs are quite different from those of
FTAs and CUs. The author derives seven testable hypotheses, of which Hypothesis
3 states that the possibility of concluding a PTA by a pair of countries increases as
their quality of governance ameliorates.
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Four categories of FTA determinants can be inferred from this theoretical
framework: economic geography factors, intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade
determinants and socio-political factors. They will all be considered in the empirical
analysis.
3.2 Econometric model
Probit and logit models have often been used to model discrete choice phenomena (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman 1985). In this context, a logit model is a discrete choice system
interpreted as a particular case of a model, the dependent variable of which is subject to
limited variability, is not continuous and takes a finite number of values (McFadden and
Train 2000; Koppelman and Wen 1998). This type of system describes the behaviour of
economic agents in terms of probability. The probability of a specific selection is
assigned to a series of explanatory values. This series of values gathers the
characteristics of decision-makers and/or the attributes of the various choice alternatives.
Multinomial logit or probit models are used when there are more than two
alternatives. However, they fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent
variable used in this research. We aim to model the choice of sequential binary
decisions, the first consisting of a pair of countries that either sign a preferential trade
agreement (PTA) or do not. Once a country comes to a bilateral agreement, the next
decision will be whether to take a further step and go to a higher level of integration.
Therefore, the model objective is to take a series of binary decisions, each consisting
of the decision of whether to accept the current value or to “take one more”.2 In this
context, Amemiya (1975) describes a model that applies to ordered discrete
alternatives, such as the number of cars owned by a household. This is based on
the assumption of local (as opposed to global) utility maximisation. The decision-
maker stops when the first local optimum is reached. Economic agents must choose
between two sequential options, and their selection depends on their characteristics
and their environment. In accordance with the characteristics of our dependent
variable, an ordered logit model was specified in our study.
The model is built around a latent regression in the same way as the binomial
probit model. An observed ordinal variable, Y, is a function of an unobserved latent
variable, Y*, which represents the difference in utility levels from an action. The
continuous latent variable Y* has a number of threshold points, and the value of the
observed variable Y depends on whether or not a particular threshold is crossed. In
the present analysis we assume that five different integration levels can be reached,
therefore the number of thresholds is five,
Y i ¼ 0 if Y*i  d1;Y i ¼ 1 if d1  Y*i  d2;Y i ¼ 2 if d2  Y*i d3;
Y i ¼ 3 if d3  Y*i  d4;Y i ¼ 4 if d4  Y*i  d5;Y i ¼ 5 if Y*i  d5
ð1Þ
where the δs are the unknown parameters to be estimated. Threshold 1 denotes that a
pair of countries engages in a PTA, threshold 2 denotes an FTA, threshold 3 is a CU,
threshold 4 is an SM, and threshold 5 represents an MU.
2 There are instances in which the RIAs are moribund, then countries can decide to “take one less”. This is
not the case in the data being looked at.
Determinants of Deep Integration: Examining Socio-political Factors 483




bkXki þ "i ¼ Zi þ "i ð2Þ
where Xki are the explanatory variables, βk are the coefficients and εi is the random
disturbance term that is assumed to be independent of X and has a logistic distribution.




bkXki ¼ E Y*i
 
ð3Þ
Once the βk parameter and the M-1 δs have been estimated, they can be used to
calculate the probability that Y will take on a particular value. For example, whenM=6,
Pr Y ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ Pr Zi  0ð Þ ¼ 11þexp Zid1ð Þ
Pr Y ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Pr Zi  d1ð Þ  Pr Zi  0ð Þ ¼ 11þexp Zid2ð Þ  11þexp Zid1ð Þ
Pr Y ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ Pr Zi  d2ð Þ  Pr Zi  d1ð Þ ¼ 11þexp Zid3ð Þ  11þexp Zid2ð Þ
Pr Y ¼ 3ð Þ ¼ Pr Zi  d3ð Þ  Pr Zi  d2ð Þ ¼ 11þexp Zid4ð Þ  11þexp Zid3ð Þ
Pr Y ¼ 4ð Þ ¼ Pr Zi  d4ð Þ  Pr Zi  d3ð Þ ¼ 11þexp Zid5ð Þ  11þexp Zid4ð Þ
Pr Y ¼ 5ð Þ ¼ Pr d5  Zið Þ ¼ 1 11þexp Zid5ð Þ
ð4Þ
Hence, using the estimated value of Z and the assumed logistic distribution of the
disturbance term, the ordered logit model can be used to estimate the probability that
the unobserved variable Y* falls within the various threshold limits.
The unknown coefficients and the thresholds can be estimated numerically by the
maximum likelihood method, where the above probabilities are the elements of the
likelihood function. The probability that a higher integration level is chosen
increases if the βs are positive and the corresponding explanatory variable increases.
This can be seen by calculating the derivatives of the cumulative probabilities:
@Pr Yi  Mð Þ
@Xki
¼ bj
exp Zi  dkð Þ
1þ exp Zi  dkð Þð Þ2
ð5Þ
Since the interpretation of the coefficients of this kind of model is unclear, a
commonly used practice is to calculate the marginal effects associated with the
probability of an RIA being formed or higher integration stages being established.
They are given by:
@Pr Yi ¼ Mð Þ
@Xki
¼ bj
exp Zi  dkð Þ
1þ exp Zi  dkð Þð Þ2
 exp Zi  dk1ð Þ
1þ exp Zi  dk1ð Þð Þ2
 !
ð6Þ
One advantage of an ordered logit over an ordered probit model is its simplicity.
However, it is subject to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property,
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which constitutes a tight limitation as all alternatives must follow an independent choice
function. Selection pairs Pi/Pj of alternative i over j are independent of whether third
alternatives exist. The advantage of this condition is that it enables the introduction of
new alternatives, such as new integration levels, without having to re-estimate the
model. The difference between the estimated parameters must be the same, regardless
of the number of alternatives that the economic agent faces. The disadvantage of this
property is that alternatives must be perceived as distinct and independent.
The evaluation of this type of model differs from traditional models in certain ways.
Even though the ratio of an estimated coefficient to its corresponding estimated standard
error follows a t-Student distribution, the F test is not appropriate for these models. The
most commonly accepted test is the Pseudo-R2, a scalar measure of the explanatory
power of the model derived from the maximum likelihood ratio.3 This test is defined as:
r2 ¼ 1 log Lu
log Lc
ð7Þ
Where: Lu = the likelihood function of the model with explanatory variables.
Lc = the likelihood function of the model without explanatory variables and only
one constant.
ρ2 lies between zero and one, and equals 1 when the model is a perfect predictor:
Pi ¼ F Xibð Þ ¼ 1 if Yi ¼ 10 if Yi ¼ 0

ð8Þ
P takes value 0 if log Lc = log Lu, thus ρ
2 increases to 1 when log Lc rises in
relation to log Lu.
An alternative way to evaluate the goodness of fit of an ordered logit is to
calculate the exp (log likelihood / number of observations) which is the geometric
average of P (Oj / Xj, estimates), where Oj and Xj are the outcome and the
explanatory variables for observation j. This ratio shows the probability of obtaining
a certain outcome conditional on the estimates. The higher the ratio is, the greater the
explanatory power of the model will be.
The interpretation of coefficients in an ordered logit model also differs explicitly from
other models. In discrete choice logit and probit models, the sign of the coefficients
denotes the direction of switch, but its magnitude is difficult to interpret. For example, the
positive coefficients corresponding to the characteristics of the individuals in the ordered
logit model estimated in this paper increase the probability that a pair of countries will be
observed in a higher integration category. However, negative coefficients increase the
probability that a pair of countries will be observed in a lower integration category.
4 Data, hypothesis and variables
4.1 The data
The model is first estimated with the data of 66 countries from 1999, representing
over 75% of world trade (see Table A.1, Appendix A in Márquez-Ramos et al 2009).
3 Also known as the likelihood ratio index (LRI).
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Data on income are obtained from the World Development Indicators (2001).
Distances are the great circle distances between economic centres. Data on capital
labour ratios are obtained from the Penn World Tables. Data on bilateral exports are
obtained from Statistics Canada (2001), and tariff barriers from the World Bank
website. Information about geographical and language dummies is from the CIA
(2003). The Economic Freedom Index was obtained from the Heritage Foundation,
and the political regime, from the Freedom House. A more detailed description of
data and sources is presented in Table A.2, Appendix A in Márquez-Ramos et al.
(2009). Finally, the agreements considered to build the dependent variable are also
listed in Márquez-Ramos et al. (2009) (Table A.3).
4.2 Hypothesis and variables
According to the underlying theory described above, and in the context of the
discrete choice model, our first hypothesis is that a pair of countries will be more
likely to form or enhance an RIA when the distance between them is small. We
specify the distance variable as in BB. This variable is called “natural” as it is
defined as the logarithm of the inverse of distance between trading partners.
A second hypothesis is that the probability of RIA formation or enhancement
increases as the remoteness of a country or pair of countries from the rest of the world
rises. For comparative purposes, we constructed the same remoteness variable used by
BB. When a country is relatively far from its trading partners, it tends to trade more
bilaterally with its neighbours, thereby increasing the probability of RIA formation.
The third hypothesis is that the larger the economic size of the trading countries,
the greater the probability of RIA formation or enhancement will be. RGDPij
measures the sum of the logs of real GDPs of countries i and j in 1960.4
The fourth hypothesis is that the more similar the countries’ economic size is, the
higher the probability of RIA formation or enhancement will be. DRGDPij is the absolute
value of the difference between the logs of real GDPs of countries i and j in 1960.
The fifth hypothesis is that the larger the countries’ economic size outside the
RIA is, the lower the probability of RIA formation or enhancement will be.
However, the size of the rest of the world (ROW) measured by the ROW GDP varies
only slightly in a cross-section of countries and has not been included in the
regression. BB obtained a non-significant coefficient for this variable.
The sixth hypothesis is that the probability that a pair of countries will form or
enhance an RIA is higher if there is a larger difference in their relative factor
endowments since traditional comparative advantages will be further exploited.
However, if intercontinental transport costs are low, this probability may also
decrease at high levels of specialisation. This can be modelled by adding a quadratic
term to the estimated equation. We use absolute differences in the capital stock per
worker ratio (DKLij) as a proxy for relative factor endowment differences, as in BB.
5
SQDKLij denotes squared DKLij.
4 Data are from 1960 to avoid the problems derived from the endogeneity of income in the estimated
equation. The same applies to variables DRGDPij and DKLij.
5 Data are for 1965 rather than 1960, since data on capital labour ratios is only available from 1965
onwards in the Penn World Tables data series. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use data for 1960.
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The seventh hypothesis is that more democratic countries (democracy) display a
greater likelihood of concluding RIAs than other countries, as stated by Mansfield et
al. (2002).
The eighth hypothesis is that a pair of countries is more likely to form or enhance
an RIA than if they have a higher level of economic freedom and if they speak a
common language.
The ninth hypothesis is that interior countries (landlocked) as well as neighbour-
ing countries (adjacency) will have a higher probability of engaging in an RIA,
especially with coastal countries. However, when a landlocked country trades with
partners located in another continent (unnatural partner), it will have higher transport
costs than a coastal country.
Finally, the tenth hypothesis is that countries with higher levels of protection
(tariff barriers) will have more incentives to create or enhance an RIA with other
countries in order to lower (or eliminate) artificial trade barriers and to facilitate
trade.
Supplementary economic, geographical and socio-political variables are added to
the list of variables used by BB as determinants of RIAs (hypotheses 7–10).
Landlocked status and adjacency are added to the list of geographical variables used
by BB. The socio-political variables considered are: tariff barriers, sharing a
common language, the political regime (this variable takes a value of 1 when the
political regime was a democracy in 1950),6 and the level of economic freedom. The
economic freedom variable takes a value between 1 and 1.99 for free countries, 2–
2.99 for mostly free countries, 3–3.99 for mostly non-free countries and 4–4.99 for
repressed countries. According to the hypotheses above, tariffs, language and
democracy are expected to have a positive sign, and economic freedom is expected
to have a negative coefficient.7
Bilateral trade flows were initially added as an economic variable. Trade flows
were expected to have a positive sign since more trade between countries indicates a
strong relationship and dependence, and a reason to sign an RIA. However, due to
the endogeneity problems found for bilateral trade, we chose to exclude this variable
from the estimations. Magee (2003) provides one of the first assessments of the
hypothesis that two countries are more likely to form a PTA if they are already major
trading partners. He estimates a probit and a non-linear two-stage least squares
model that considers trade flows to be endogenous in the second specification.
Magee’s results show that greater bilateral trade flows significantly increase the
likelihood that countries will form a preferential trade agreement in every
specification of the model.
In this paper, the model estimated is an ordered logit. Five different possible
levels of integration between pairs of countries are considered to investigate the
determinants of regional integration agreements.
6 Data for this variable were only available for the years 1950 and 2000. To avoid the problems derived
from the endogeneity of democracy in the estimated equation, we used the data from 1950.
7 Note that according to the definition of these variables, higher values imply lower economic freedom.
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5 Estimation results
5.1 Ordered logit estimation8
We estimate an ordered logit model consisting of a system of 5 equations with
common coefficients for all the explanatory variables and with different constant
terms. This is known as the proportional odds model.
In the second column of Table 1 (Model 1), an ordered logit is estimated with
economic and geographical variables, the same variables included in BB (probit
estimation). Model 2 to Model 4 in columns 3 to 5 of Table 1 are estimated for
different sets of variables grouped as geographical and socio-political variables, and
Model 5 includes all the variables. This sequential analysis enables us to find out the
most important factors in promoting RIAs.
The results are similar in both probit and ordered logit models,9 although the logit
ordered coefficients are higher in magnitude. In general terms, we can state that the
probability of reaching a higher level of integration is higher than the probability of
signing any type of RIA when no previous agreement exists between the trading
countries. However, as stated above, there is no consensus on the interpretation of
the magnitude of the coefficients estimated in discrete choice models.
Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 show the results of the geographical variables. All
geographical variables are significant at 1%, and natural, remoteness and adjacency
have a positive signed coefficient, while the landlocked variable coefficient is
negative. In Model 3 the interaction variable (landlocked*remoteness) is added to
consider the ambiguous sign expected for the landlocked variable. The estimated
coefficient shows a positive sign, indicating that the probability of reaching a higher
level of integration increases for more remote continental trading partners when one
of them is landlocked.
Model 4, in column five of Table 1, shows that all the socio-political variables are
significant: democracy, higher levels of economic freedom and a common language
promote RIA enhancement. The coefficient on tariffs is positive, thus showing that a
higher level of protection increases the probability that a country pair will be
observed in a higher category. However, in terms of goodness-of-fit, Pseudo R2 is
very low.
Finally, Model 5 includes economic, geographical and socio-political varia-
bles. Some interaction terms were also added to allow for the possibility that the
effect of some variables, namely remoteness and language, could be different for
natural and unnatural patterns. In this model, remoteness presents a negative
sign, indicating that remote countries have a lower probability of reaching higher
levels of integration, while the variables adjacency, language and tariffs are not
statistically significant.
The Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) shows that the best specification is that
estimated in Model 5, where all the variables are considered. For the specification
where only geographical variables are considered, the AIC is lower (1.542) than that
8 The results obtained when a binary probit is estimated are shown in Márquez-Ramos et al. (2009)
9 See Márquez-Ramos et al. (2009)
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obtained in regressions including only socio-political factors (1.681). This appears to
indicate that geographical variables are important determinants of RIA formation.
As stated above, the interpretation of the coefficients in an ordered logit does
not inform of the magnitude of switch since we can only state that positive
coefficients increase the likelihood that the country pairs will be observed in a
higher category, and negative coefficients increase the likelihood that the country
pairs will be observed in a lower category. A preferable interpretation of the
Table 1 Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Economic variables
RGDP 0.18a (6.89) – – – 0.13a (3.45)
DRGDP −0.17a (−3.77) – – – −0.31a (−6.14)
DKL −0.26a (−3.34) – – – −0.30a (−3.25)
Geographical variables
NATURAL 1.49a (10.95) 0.84a (12.83) 0.83a (12.54) – 2.31a (8.26)
REMOTE 0.31a (6.28) 0.24a (9.35) 0.23a (8.22) – −2.21b (−2.40)
ADJACENCY – 0.49a (2.87) 0.47a (2.79) – −0.08 (−0.24)
LANDLOCKED – −0.63a (−5.92) −0.94a (−5.46) – 0.27 (0.79)
LANDLOCKEDcREMOTE 0.14b (2.36) 0.15 (1.48)
NATURALcREMOTE −0.32a (−2.89)
Socio-political variables
LANGUAGE – – – 0.50a (4.73) −1.09 (−0.43)
DEMOCRACY – – – 1.55a (11.01) 0.49b (2.32)
ECONOMIC FREEDOM – – – −0.51a (−2.65) −1.05b (−2.23)
TARIFF BARRIERS 0.20b (2.46) 0.14 (0.76)
NATURALcLANGUAGE 0.05 (0.18)
Cut 1 −3.41 −5.87 −5.79 1.38 −14.82
Cut 2 −2.71 −4.9 −4.82 2.13 −14.01
Cut 3 −1.8 −4.18 −4.11 2.56 −13.23
Cut 4 −1.58 −3.86 −3.78 2.83 −12.91
Cut 5 0.38 −2.64 −2.57 3.95 −10.41
McFadden’s R2 0.3112 0.1297 0.1306 0.011 0.355
Log likelihood −1040.8 −3198.63 −3195.60 −2967.25 −889.71
Exp (log likelihood / observations) 0.4954 0.4635 0.4646 0.4324 0.5127
Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) 1.418 1.542 1.539 1.681 1.363
Number of observations 1,482 4,160 4,160 3,540 1,332
a significance at 1%
b significance at 5%
c significance at 10%
Z-statistics are in brackets. The dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 when trading partners were integrated respectively into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU in 1999, and
0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used instead of the traditional calculation,
therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Bilateral trade, exporter’s and
importer’s tariff barriers and economic freedom are shown in natural logarithms
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ordered logit coefficients is in terms of the odd ratios. The exponentiated coefficients in
the logit model, shown in Table 2, can be interpreted as odds ratios for a 1-unit change
in the corresponding variable. The emphasis is on the ratio “Exp(β)”, which is the
odds conditional on x+1 divided by the odds conditional on x. For example in Model
1, 1.19 means that the odds of being in a higher integration level increase by 1.19 if
RGDP increases by 1. The interpretation can also be made in terms of percentages: the
exp(1.49) obtained in the “natural” variable in Model 1 means that the odds increase
by 346% {[exp(1.49)−1]*100} if the variable increases by 1, therefore the odds of
being part of the monetary union versus lower integration levels is 346% higher for a
one-unit increase in the “natural” variable. Table 2 shows that, in Model 5, the most
important determinant of an RIA is the “natural” variable, followed by democracy
(1.64), landlocked (1.31), tariff barriers (1.15) and real GDP (1.13).
We also calculate semi-standardised ordered logit coefficients that control for the
metrics of the independent variables to see whether any change occurs in the ordering of
effects. The option of standardised coefficients to measure the relative strength of the
effects of the independent variables is more appropriate in the current empirical
application since some independent variables are measured in different units. Table 2
shows that when standardised coefficients are considered (e^bStdX), the ordering of
the effects changes slightly. In Model 5, the “natural” variable’s standardised
coefficient is 7.95, and it is 1.43 for RGDP and 1.22 for democracy. Therefore, the
natural variable is still the most important followed by real GDP and democracy.
In order to evaluate the probability that the dependent variable will have a
particular value, we use cut-offs terms. From Eq. 1, the threshold parameters for
Model 1 are given by:
Yi ¼ 0 if Y*i  3:41;Yi ¼ 1 if  3:41  Y*i  2:71;Yi ¼ 2 if  2:71  Y*i  1:8;
Yi ¼ 3 if  1:8  Y*i  1:58;Yi ¼ 4 if  1:58  Y*i  0:38;Yi ¼ 5 if Y*i  0:38
For example, when the trading partners are Argentina and Paraguay, we can
calculate the probability associated with this pair of countries by computing Zi with
the obtained coefficients in Model 1 and the corresponding data:10
Pr Y ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 0:2442; Pr Y ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 0:1499; Pr Y ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ 0:2236; Pr Y ¼ 3ð Þ ¼ 0:0505;
Pr Y ¼ 4ð Þ ¼ 0:2664; Pr Y ¼ 5ð Þ ¼ 0:0654
Hence for Argentina and Paraguay, the most likely outcome is that they will form
a single market. In fact, they have been members of Mercosur since 1995.
Our second example is Spain and France, a pair of trading partners that are
members of the European Union. Our results indicate that the highest probability is
that of the establishment of a single market. In 1999 these countries were already in
the third phase of the European Monetary Union (EMU), since they fulfilled the
convergence criteria established in the Treaty of Maastricht. However, our results
most probably show that they were only in the EMU starting phase. When the socio-
political variables are also considered (Model 5), then our results indicate that the
highest probability is that of the establishment of a monetary union.11
10 See Márquez-Ramos et al. (2009)
11 See Márquez-Ramos et al. (2009)
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Table 2 Odds ratios for the ordered logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Economic variables
RGDP coef 0.18a – – – 0.13a
e^b 1.19 – – – 1.13
e^bStdX 1.65 – - 1.43
DRGDP coef −0.17a – – – −0.31a
e^b 0.84 – – 0.73
e^bStdX 0.74 – – 0.59
DKL coef −0.26a – – – −0.30a
e^b 0.77 – – – 0.74
e^bStdX 0.75 – – 0.71
Geographical variables
NATURAL coef 1.49a 0.84a 0.84a – 2.31a
e^b 4.46 2.33 2.30 – 10.09
e^bStdX 3.89 2.10 2.08 7.95
REMOTE coef 0.31a 0.24a 0.22a – −2.21b
e^b 1.37 1.28 1.25 – 0.11
e^bStdX 1.76 1.51 1.47 0.02
ADJACENCY coef – 0.49a 0.47a – −0.08
e^b – 1.63 1.60 – 0.92
e^bStdX – 1.09 1.09 0.99
LANDLOCKED coef – −0.63a −0.94a – 0.27
e^b – 0.53 0.39 – 1.31
e^bStdX – 0.77 0.68 1.12
LANDLOCKEDcREMOTE coef – – 0.14b – 0.15
e^b – – 1.15 – 1.17





LANGUAGE coef – – – 0.50a −1.09
e^b – – – 1.65 0.33
e^bStdX – – – 1.19 0.67
DEMOCRACY coef – – – 1.55a 0.49b
e^b – – – 4.69 1.64
e^bStdX – – – 1.61 1.22
ECONOMIC FREEDOM coef – – – −0.51a −1.05b
e^b – – – 0.60 0.35
e^bStdX – – – 0.85 0.72
TARIFF BARRIERS coef – – – 0.20b 0.14
e^b – – – 1.22 1.15
e^bStdX – – – 1.17 1.11
NATURALcLANGUAGE coef 0.05
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The calculation of the predicted probabilities for all the trading partners12 shows
that 69% of the agreements and 84% of the non-agreements were correctly predicted
by the ordered logit model. Of all cases, 17% had excessive bilateralism,13 i.e., when
the predicted level of integration was lower than the real level, and we found that
bilateralism was insufficient for 6.5% of the trading partners.
5.2 Marginal effects
As BB point out, “one complication arises in estimating the partial effects on the
response probabilities for the particular vector of RHS variables, x, in our model by
using mean values for the levels. One of the RHS variables, REMOTE, is the
product of a continuous variable and a binary variable (…) the mean value of this
variable is economically meaningless”.14
As we also use REMOTE, we estimate separately the marginal effects on the
response probabilities with the mean value of REMOTE when the trading partners
are in the same continent, and when REMOTE takes the value of zero (the trading
partners are not in the same continent, they are unnatural partners).
To compare the effect of the RHS variables across different levels of integration,
in Table 3 we estimate the marginal effects (for Model 5) for all the integration levels
for both natural and unnatural partners.15
Table 3 shows different probabilities depending on the level of integration. For
each level of integration, the probabilities are shown for natural and for unnatural
partners. However, for the three last categories (customs union, single market and
monetary union) the probabilities can only be calculated for natural partners since
these integration levels are only reached by countries in the same continent. These
12 According to Model 1.
13 “Excessive” and “insufficient” bilateralism are terms used by BB.
14 Baier and Bergstrand (2004), page 55.
15 Dummy variables are not included since the mean values of these variables do not have an economic
interpretation.
Table 2 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
e^b 1.05
e^bStdX 1.18
a significance at 1%
b significance at 5%
c significance at 10%
Odd ratios are e^b and e^bstdX. e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X; e^bStdX =
exp(b*SD of X) = change in odds for SD increase in X. The dependent variable is a discrete variable that
takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 when trading partners were integrated respectively into a PTA, FTA, CU,
SM and MU in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used instead of
the traditional calculation, therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Exporter’s and importer’s tariff barriers and economic freedom are shown in natural logarithms
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Table 3 Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 5 (evaluated at the
mean level of remote and at remote = 0)
Yi = Pr (Preferential Trade Agreement | natural partners) = 0.167
Variable dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL −0.007 −0.310 −0.047 0.034
REMOTE 3.373a 5.770 2.227 4.518
RGDP 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000
DRGDP 0.028a 3.880 0.014 0.043
DKL 0.009 0.540 −0.025 0.043
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 0.762a 5.480 0.490 1.035
TARIFF BARRIERS −0.393a −4.670 −0.558 −0.228
Yi = Pr (Preferential Trade Agreement | unnatural partners) = 0.031
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL 0.071a 6.950 0.051 0.091
RGDP 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.000
DRGDP −0.004b −2.040 −0.008 0.000
DKL −0.019a −5.250 −0.026 −0.012
ECONOMIC FREEDOM −0.011 −0.270 −0.089 0.068
TARIFF BARRIERS 0.052a 3.140 0.019 0.084
Yi = Pr (Free Trade Agreement | natural partners) = 0.189
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL −0.003 −0.310 −0.023 0.016
REMOTE 1.587a 2.910 0.518 2.657
RGDP 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000
DRGDP 0.013a 3.310 0.005 0.021
DKL 0.004 0.540 −0.012 0.020
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 0.359a 3.370 0.150 0.567
TARIFF BARRIERS −0.185a −2.540 −0.328 −0.042
Yi = Pr (Free Trade Agreement | unnatural partners) = 0.024
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL 0.058a 5.720 0.038 0.078
RGDP 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.000
DRGDP −0.003b −2.140 −0.007 0.000
DKL −0.015a −5.740 −0.021 −0.010
ECONOMIC FREEDOM −0.009 −0.270 −0.073 0.055
TARIFF BARRIERS 0.043a 4.150 0.023 0.063
Yi = Pr (Customs Union | natural partners) = 0.125
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL 0.000 0.330 −0.002 0.003
REMOTE −0.251 −0.840 −0.835 0.333
RGDP 0.000 −0.190 0.000 0.000
DRGDP −0.002 −0.820 −0.007 0.003
DKL −0.001 −0.390 −0.004 0.003
ECONOMIC FREEDOM −0.057 −0.850 −0.188 0.074
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probabilities depend mainly on geographical, socio-political and economic variables,
and their marginal effects differ across integration levels.
On the one hand, the results obtained for natural partners (countries in the same
continent) indicate that when remoteness increases by 1%, the probability of a PTA or an
FTAbeing established increases by 337% and 159%, respectively. However, the probability
of a customs union or a higher integration agreement being established decreases with
remoteness. This variable, together with socio-political factors, is the most influential factor
on the probability of an RIA being formed or enhanced between natural partners.
Higher GDP differences increase the probability of PTA or FTA formation for natural
partners, although the sign of themarginal effect for higher levels of integration is reversed,
thus indicating that similarity of income, as expected, increases the probability that higher
levels of integration (customs union, single market and monetary union) will be reached.
The integration theory predicts that the costs of integration are lower when countries have
similar levels of income and, consequently, a high level of intra-industry trade.
For unnatural partners however (countries in a different continent), the inverse of
distance is the most important factor in PTA or FTA formation, and higher
differences in income and in factor endowments lower the probability of a PTA or an
FTA being established.
Finally, the results show the most likely outcomes are that natural partners
will establish a single market and unnatural partners will not reach any
agreement. When we order the probabilities for the various types of integration
TARIFF BARRIERS 0.029 0.860 −0.038 0.096
Yi = Pr (Single Market | natural partners) = 0.381
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL 0.014 0.310 −0.073 0.100
REMOTE −7.104a −6.880 −9.129 −5.080
RGDP 0.000 −0.190 −0.001 0.001
DRGDP −0.060a −4.570 −0.085 −0.034
DKL −0.020 −0.540 −0.091 0.052
ECONOMIC FREEDOM −1.606a −6.920 −2.061 −1.151
TARIFF BARRIERS 0.828a 5.060 0.507 1.149
Yi = Pr (Monetary Union | natural partners) = 0.027
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval
NATURAL 0.002 0.310 −0.009 0.012
REMOTE −0.857a −6.180 −1.129 −0.585
RGDP 0.000 −0.190 0.000 0.000
DRGDP −0.007a −3.620 −0.011 −0.003
DKL −0.002 −0.550 −0.011 0.006
ECONOMIC FREEDOM −0.194a −4.540 −0.277 −0.110
TARIFF BARRIERS 0.100a 5.090 0.061 0.138
a significance at 1%
b significance at 5%
Table 3 (continued)
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agreements from the highest probability to the lowest probability for natural
partners, we obtain:
Pr SM or 4ð Þ ¼ 0:38; Pr FTA or 2ð Þ ¼ 0:19; Pr PTA or 1ð Þ ¼ 0:17; Pr CU or 3ð Þ
¼ 0:12; Pr MU or 5ð Þ ¼ 0:03
These findings can seem surprising since the (conventionally assumed) second
most integrated type of agreement, a single market, is the most likely type of RIA.
An explanation is that the results obtained are likely to be dominated by the
European Common Market.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
We performed several robustness tests to validate our results. Firstly, the ordered logit
model is based on the assumption of parallel slopes but this may be unrealistic, for
example, if geographical variables are less relevant for higher integration levels.
Therefore, the Brant test of the parallel regression assumption is used to validate the
methodology used. The Brant (1990) test assesses whether or not the coefficients are
the same for each category of the dependent variable. This produces Wald Tests for
the null hypothesis that the coefficients in each independent variable are constant
across categories of the dependent variable. Significant test statistics provide evidence
that this assumption has been violated for most of the variables. With the exception of
the capital-labour ratio, we cannot accept the equality of slopes for the different levels
of integration (Table 4). These results indicate that we should estimate a generalised
logit model, and they suggest what variables may be used in determining the
thresholds. We therefore estimated a generalised ordered logit for all the regressions
presented in Table 1. In some cases, the model did not converge, especially when the
variables with missing data (K-L differences) were included. The results16 indicate
that the geographical variables are significant and show the expected signs for the
lower levels of integration (PTA, FTA), whereas these variables lose significance and
decrease in magnitude for the higher levels. In contrast, the economic and political
variables gain importance in the higher levels of integration.
Secondly, we re-estimated the ordered logit model with an alternative data set
including 172 countries in 1998 taken from Magee (2003), which are available for
replications on his web site. Our results confirm the sign and significance of the
estimated coefficients for the income variables, the relative factor endowment
differences and the natural variable. Contrary to BB, the K–L differences variable is
negative and significant, thus validating our evidence.17
Thirdly, the observations are twice the number of country pairs. However, our
dependent variable is symmetric and only trade and tariffs are asymmetric (Xij≠Xji).
Therefore, we have re-estimated the model with only half the observations to check
whether this would have affected the results. By taking 2145 ((66*65)/2) country
pairs, the results remained unchanged.18
16 Results are available upon request from the authors.
17 See Model 7.1 in Table 1 in Márquez-Ramos et al. (2009).
18 The results of taking into account the “repetition bias” in the 66-country sample are available upon
request from the authors.
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Fourthly, an additional robustness test has been performed. We checked whether
the results were affected by the exclusion of an important economic bloc, such as the
EU. The results excluding the EU countries also remained unchanged.19
Finally, the ordered nature of the dependent variable and the endogeneity of trade
flows should ideally be considered simultaneously, although this is beyond the scope
of this research.
6 The dynamics of the European Union integration process
The EU is the best real example of a successful integration process. However, the
fact that the analysis in the previous sections focuses on data for 1999 implies that
neither the entrance of 10 countries into the EU in 2004 nor the adoption of the Euro
by Greece.20 In order to tackle the above-mentioned issues, the proposed model is
also estimated for an additional sample, including data for the EU-27 from 1999 to
2007. A dynamic analysis would also be possible by adding the time dimension to
the data.
In relation to the socio-political factors, democracy in 1950 was used in the
previous section. Nonetheless, this variable may have very little to do with the
probability of a country pair forming or enhancing an RIA during the period 1999–
2007 in Europe. Although Spain and Portugal were dictatorships in 1950, both
restored democracy in the mid-1970s, and joined the European Community (EC) in
1986. Greece also restored democracy in the mid-1970s and joined the EC in 1981.
Hence, these three countries were democracies at the time they joined the EC. The
same applies to the former socialist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.
Therefore, unlike the analysis performed in Section 5, we take into account the
political regime at the time of entry into the EC and not the situation in 1950. Instead
of a dummy variable for democracy, the variable “polity” is used.21 Political rights
and civil liberties at the time of entry into the EC have also been added to the list of
Table 4 Brant test of parallel regression
Variable chi2 p>chi2 df
All −336.22 1.000 20
RGDP 18.53 0.001 4
DRGDP 10.44 0.034 4
DKL 8.55 0.073 4
NATURAL 381.42 0.000 4
REMOTE 155.06 0.000 4
A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated
19 These results are available upon request from the authors.
20 A referee kindly suggested the inclusion of this section in the paper.
21 Annual data for democracy are obtained from the Polity IV dataset (http://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscr/p4v2007.xls). The variable POLITY2, which varies from -10 (strong dictatorship) to 10 (full
democracy), is used in Section 6.
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political variables. They are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing
the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.22
Table 5 shows the results obtained for the EU-27 sample. In the second column of
Table 5 (Model 6), an ordered logit is estimated with the same variables included in
Model 1 (Table 1).23 Model 7 to Model 9, in columns 3 to 5 of Table 5 report the
results for models with different sets of variables grouped as geographical and socio-
political variables. Finally, Model 10 includes all the variables, as in Model 5 (Table 1).
Model 6 shows that the sign of the coefficients for the EU-27 sample is similar to
the obtained for the 66-country sample (Model 1), although the coefficients are
lower in magnitude. Model 7 shows the results when only geographical variables are
included as regressors. All the geographical variables are significant at 1% and have
the expected sign. Natural and adjacency have a positive-signed coefficient, while
the landlocked variable coefficient is negative. Model 8 shows that all the socio-
political variables are significant: “polity”, the level of economic freedom (property
rights and civil liberties) and the common language promote RIA enhancement.
Model 9 includes an additional variable (tariff barriers), measuring the bilateral
weighted tariffs between trading partners before accessing the EU-27. Unlike the
results found in Table 1, the coefficient of this variable is negative, showing that a
higher level of protection lowers the probability of a country pair being observed in a
higher category in the European Union integration process. Model 10 includes
economic, geographical and socio-political variables, excluding “polity” which
correlates with the GDP. In this model, all the variables present the expected sign
and are statistically significant. Model 11 includes a lagged dependent variable that
indicates the previous integration level. This variable takes into account the fact that
the probability of reaching an integration level depends on the point of departure
(i.e., countries that do not have a previous agreement do not usually go straight into
a monetary union). The results show that the probability of reaching a deeper
integration level is higher if the countries already participate in an RIA.
Finally as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), the previous specifications assumed
that RIAij is independent across observations. Since this assumption is not very
realistic and could influence the estimation results, we followed the method
proposed by Pesaran (2006) to account for interdependencies. This method consists
in approximating the linear combinations of the unobserved factors by cross-section
averages of the explained and explanatory variables and then running standard panel
regressions augmented by the cross-section averages. This approach also yields
consistent estimates when the regressors correlate with the factors. The results are
presented in Model 12 and indicate that interdependencies matter (the added
variables are statistically significant) but do not alter the sign of the estimated
coefficients of the variables included in Model 10.
22 Annual data on political rights and civil liberties are obtained from The Freedom House (2009): http://
www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_AllScores_Countries.xls
23 DKL is not included in the analysis for the European integration process since DKL was not significant
in the deepest integration levels (see Table 3). Remoteness is also calculated for the European country
sample as was done in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), however, this variable is not included in the
regressions since is not considered as comparable to the one constructed for the 66-country sample which
includes unnatural partners.
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Table 5 Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement. The European
integration process
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Economic variables
RGDP 0.13a (16.53) – – – 0.10a (10.52) 0.05a (3.03) 0.11a (10.50)
DRGDP −0.09a (−6.13) – – – −0.11a (−7.30) −0.10a (−4.24) −0.12a (−7.62)
Geographical variables
NATURAL 0.18a (6.40) 0.21a (6.38) – – 0.16a (4.48) 0.12b (2.35) 0.16a (4.74)
ADJACENCY – 0.72a (7.49) – – 0.61a (6.13) 0.24c (1.92 ) 0.61a (6.02)





LANGUAGE – – 1.82a (8.90) 1.81a (8.97) 1.29a (7.91) −0.17 (−1.28) 1.62a (10.55)
POLITY – – 0.96 a (18.16) 1.24a (20.22) – – –
POLITICAL
RIGHTS



























Cut 1 1.72 −5.53 −0.46 0.82 −5.93 2.76 5.04
Cut 2 4.54 −2.52 4.00 6.74 −2.31 10.07 8.89
Cut 3 4.75 −2.29 4.19 6.99 −2.00 10.78 9.27
Cut 4 6.51 −0.39 6.33 9.58 0.25 18.00 11.75
McFadden’s R2 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.62 0.21




0.27 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.61 0.35
Number of
observations
6,561 6,561 5,331 5,272 6,561 5,832 6,561
a significance at 1%
b significance at 5%
c significance at 10%
Z-statistics are in brackets. The dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 when EU-27 trading partners were integrated respectively into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU from
1999 to 2007 (There are not cases of PTA), and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of
variance is used instead of the traditional calculation; therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Bilateral trade, tariff barriers, polity, civil liberties and political rights are shown
in natural logarithms
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As in Section 5, we evaluate the probability of the dependent variable having a
particular value. Then we take the case of Spain and France24 in which our results
for both the 66-country and EU-27 samples indicate that the highest probability is
that of the establishment of a monetary union when socio-political variables were
considered (Model 5 and Model 10, respectively).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, discrete choice modelling is used to study the determinants of regional
trade agreements. An ordered logit model is estimated, in which geographical,
economic and socio-political variables are considered as explanatory variables for
RIA formation.
The results show that the probability of reaching a higher level of integration
increases with income level, economic freedom, cultural affinities and remoteness,
whereas it decreases with distance, income differences and factor endowment
differences. Additionally, although economic and geographical variables seem to
be the most important determinants of RIA formation, the socio-political factors
considered are all statistically significant and their relative importance in
explaining RIAs enhancement increases for higher integration levels and for
natural partners.
The marginal effects, calculated for natural and unnatural trading partners, show
that countries in the same continent (natural partners) will most probably establish a
single market, whereas countries in different continents (unnatural partners) are most
likely to not sign any agreement. This result is new in the RIA literature and should
be validated by extending the sample to include more years and countries. The
marginal effects also show that some variables, such as remoteness and differences
in real GDP, have a positive influence on the formation of an RIA, but only for
countries in the same continent and in the early stages of the integration process
(PTA, FTA). However, when the categories considered are higher integration levels,
the effect of these two variables is reversed. The marginal effect of economic
freedom is not statistically significant for unnatural partners in the early stages of the
integration process (PTA, FTA). However, it shows that a higher level of economic
freedom has a positive influence on the enhancement of a RIA from a customs union
to a single market and from a single market to a monetary union.
The estimation of a trade equation, that considers the formation of RIAs as
an endogenously determined explanatory variable, remains an issue for further
research.
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